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Abstract
What (if anything) justifies the use of Bayesian statistics in sci-
ence? The traditional answer is that Bayesian statistics is simply an
instance of orthodox expected utility theory. Thus, Bayesian statis-
tical methods, like principles of utility theory, are justified by norms
of individual rationality. In particular, most Bayesians argue that a
scientist’s credences must satisfy the probability axioms if she adheres
to individualistic norms of practical and epistemic rationality. We ar-
gue that, to justify Bayesian statistics as a tool for science, it is only
necessary that a scientist’s public credences (i.e., her degrees of belief
qua scientist) obey the probability axioms. We call that thesis public
probabilism and argue that, to justify it, one must appeal to norms of
collective science, not just norms of individual rationality. Specifically,
we argue that individualistic norms fail to justify an Archimedean con-
dition that is necessary for credences to admit a numerical represen-
tation. However, a norm of collective science, which we call epistemic
cooperativeness, can justify the Archimedean condition.
What (if anything) justifies the use of Bayesian statistics in science?
The traditional answer is that Bayesian statistics is simply an instance of
orthodox expected utility theory, and so Bayesian statistical methods, like
principles of utility theory, are justified by norms of individual rationality.
For example, one who has credences that violate the probability axioms
is Dutch-Bookable, accuracy dominated, and so on. And if one is Dutch-
Bookable or accuracy dominated, so the standard arguments go, then one
violates some individualistic norm of practical or epistemic rationality.
In this paper, we explore an alternative defense of scientists’ use of
Bayesian statistical methods: norms of collective science may work in tan-
dem with norms of individual rationality to justify the mathematical ma-
chinery of Bayesian statistics. We focus on probabilism, the thesis that
experimenters’ credences must obey the probability axioms.
The paper contains two major sections. In §1, we criticize (versions of)
three of the most common arguments for probabilism: Dutch Book argu-
ments, accuracy dominance arguments, and representation-theorem based
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arguments.1 We argue that none of the three justifies the claim that ratio-
nal credences obey an Archimedean condition. The first two merely assume
credences are real numbers and so must have that property. Proponents of
the third argument do try to justify the Archimedean condition but they
often appeal to implausible behaviorist assumptions to do so.
In §2, we argue that, to justify the use of Bayesian statistics in science,
a scientist’s prior distribution cannot be interpreted as an her personal cre-
dences. Instead, a prior distribution must represent what we call the sci-
entist’s public credences, which are the beliefs that she adopts in virtue of
her obligations as a scientist. We then argue that a norm of collective sci-
ence, which we call epistemic cooperativeness, can justify the claim that a
scientist’s public credence should satisfy the Archimedean condition. Our
argument provides some evidence for the claim that, together, norms of in-
dividual rationality and collective science may justify public probabilism, the
thesis that scientists’ public credences should obey the probability axioms.
Should one conclude that Robinson Crusoe may rationally violate prob-
abilism but that scientists must heed Bayesian norms? Our arguments leave
open that possibility. But our arguments are better understood as opening
a different avenue for defending the claim that scientists’ behavior should
abide by decision-theoretic norms. To be clear, our arguments do not estab-
lish that the traditional, individualistic strategy for defending probabilism is
hopeless; we argue only that some common individualistic arguments share
a weakness. We also do not claim to establish that scientists’ public cre-
dences should satisfy the probability axioms. After all, we focus on only one
condition that is necessary for a probabilistic representation of credence.
The paper, therefore, should be understood as an attempted proof of
concept: we aim to show that collective norms for scientific inquiry might
better justify what are often taken as norms for rational, individual behavior.
Equally importantly, although we focus on probabilism, our argumentative
strategy may be used to justify other parts of Bayesian statistical prac-
tice that, we believe, currently lack cogent philosophical foundations. For
example, some Bayesian statisticians argue that one ought to “choose” non-
informative priors when analyzing data; others argue that scientists ought to
choose priors that have good frequentist properties.2 From the standpoint of
traditional decision theory, analyzing data using a probability distribution
1For a summary of Dutch book arguments, see [Vineberg, 2016] and references therein.
For accuracy dominance arguments, see [Joyce, 1998] and [Pettigrew, 2016]. For use of
representation theorems, see [Savage, 1972] and [Krantz et al., 2006].
2See Excursion/Chapter 6 of [Mayo, 2018] for a discussion of various ways in which
contemporary Bayesians choose priors.
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that deviates from one’s personal credences is typically irrational. Just as it
would be irrational for Alison to choose an action just because it maximizes
Bill’s subjective expected utility, a Bayesian statistician who chooses a prior
in one of the two ways just specified may advocate statistical decisions that
would fail to minimize expected loss by her own lights. This paper suggests
a novel way to rationalize these two methods for “choosing” a prior: norms
of science might require a statistician to adopt public credences that differ
from her private ones.
1 Individualistic Foundations of Bayesianism
The fundamental thesis of Bayesianism is probabilism, which asserts that
one’s credences over an algebra of events A should be representable by a
probability measure P : A → [0, 1]. What does it mean for credences to be
representable by a probability measure? Philosophers and social scientists
typically assume an agent’s credences are represented by a binary relation
 on an algebra of events, where A  B represents the claim that the agent
believes A to be at least as likely as B.3 To say that an agent’s credences
are “probabilistic” (or representable by a probability measure), therefore, is
to say there is at least one probability measure P such that A  B if and
only if P (A) ≥ P (B).4
Several canonical arguments for probabilism simply assume that cre-
dences are numerically representable, i.e., that there is a real-valued func-
tion r : A → R such that r(A) ≥ r(B) if and only if A  B. Dutch Book
arguments, for example, do so by identifying credences with fair prices (see
next section), and accuracy-dominance arguments often contain numerical
representability as a modeling assumption. Proponents of those arguments,
3Historically, binary representations are the most common way of representing com-
parative credence. However, it is well-known that some aspects of human perception are
best represented by higher arity relations. see [Krantz et al., 2006, p. 139]’s discussion
of difference structures. Further, choice behavior is often represented by choice functions
[Seidenfeld et al., 2009, Sen, 1971], which take sets of arbitrary size and output the options
that are “choice-worthy.” So it is not beyond the realm of possibility that credence should
similarly be modeled by relations of higher arity or some mathematical apparatus like
choice functions. We focus on binary relations for simplicity.
4What we call representability is often called “full agreement”; see [Fishburn, 1986].
Our argument in §1.2 requires only the conjunction of what Fishburn calls “almost” and
“partial agreement”, and that conjunction is not equivalent to full agreement except in the
presence of the additional assumption that  is total. This distinction matters because
some decision theorists aim only to defend the claim that rational credence agrees with a
probability measure in one of these weaker senses.
3
therefore, focus on defending the claim that numerically-representable cre-
dences obey the remaining probability axioms (i.e, additivity and normality).
In this paper, we take a step back and question what (if anything) justifies
the assumption that credences are representable by real numbers. In §1.1, we
first argue that some descriptive psychological theories of credence (specif-
ically, behavioristic ones) fail to justify that assumption, and in §1.2, we
argue that normative theories of (individualistic) rationality likewise falter.
1.1 What is credence?
There are roughly two types of theories of credence: behaviorist and men-
talist.5 Famously, behaviorists argue that, to explain and predict human
behavior, it is unscientific to postulate the existence of “internal” mental
states. Thus, some behaviorists identify psychological states, including de-
sires and beliefs, with observable behavioral dispositions.
For example, a behaviorist might identify an agent’s credence c(A) in
A with her fair price Pr(A), i.e., the price the agent is willing both to buy
and sell a gamble that is worth $1 if A occurs and is worth $0 otherwise.
Other behaviorists claim that an agent’s credence in B is stronger than
her credence in A (written A ≺ B) if, when forced to choose between (i)
receiving a prize if A occurs or (ii) receiving the same prize if B occurs,
the agent would choose the latter option. According to this second account,
credence is a disposition to make certain choices when decisions are forced.
Most philosophers and social scientists reject these behaviorist accounts
of credence.6 If credence is nothing more than the disposition to gamble in
particular ways in laboratory settings, then it is of little philosophical inter-
est. When philosophers and social scientists discuss credence, their working
hypothesis is that credence is an underlying mental state that is causally re-
lated to many other mental states (e.g., desires and regrets) and behaviors.7
Following [Okasha, 2016], we call such views of credence mentalist.
According to mentalism, fair prices are one crude way of measuring cre-
dence, but they are not the only way. Further, fair prices can be wildly
misleading: when forced to offer prices in a laboratory, a subject’s behav-
ior may not reflect any underlying attitude that can explain or predict her
choices in other scenarios. Similar criticisms apply to the behaviorist ac-
count that identifies credence with forced choices.
5For an enlightening discussion of behaviorist and mentalist views, see [Okasha, 2016].
6See [Eriksson and Hájek, 2007] for trenchant criticisms of behaviorist views.






Figure 1: An example of the Archimedean property for real numbers.
We will not defend mentalism, but we do reject the two behaviorist
theories above for the reasons sketched. We criticize those accounts to an-
ticipate an objection to our main argument. According to some behaviorist
theories, credence, whether rational or not, is representable by a numeri-
cal (real-valued) function, and so it follows that rational credence obeys an
Archimedean condition, pace our thesis. For example, according to the first
account, credences are fair prices, which are, by definition, numerical.
There are, of course, many ways that one might try to identify credence
with behavior. We cannot prove that no such attempt will be successful.
Rather, we claim only that if one identifies credence with behavior in a
way that make it easy to justify the claim that credences are numerical
(and hence, satisfy an Archimedean condition), then one typically faces the
difficult task of defending the claim that credence, so defined, plays any
important predictive or explanatory purpose in describing other behaviors.
In the rest of the paper, we simply assume that a person’s credence
might not be real-valued. The central question of the next section is whether
rational credence must be numerical. We argue not.
1.2 Archimedean Conditions
Real numbers satisfy an Archimedean property: for any two numbers r, s >
0, there is some natural number n such that n · r > s. See Figure 1 for a
visual example. Thus, if credences are numerically representable, then they
must obey an Archimedean-like condition. In this section, we formulate a
(simple) comparative Archimedean condition — one that can be expressed
solely in terms of  and the set-theoretic structure among events in an
algebra. Then, we provide an example of comparative credences that seem
rational but violate the condition. Thus, our Archimedean condition seems
not to be justified by norms of individual rationality.
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We first sketch our argument. Many philosophers (e.g., Nicolas of Cusa)
have believed that space is infinite and that the number of planets is likewise
infinite. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Nicolas of Cusa contem-
plated the following two hypotheses: H1, exactly one planet, Earth, contains
water in liquid or solid form on its surface, and H2, at least two planets con-
tain water. For each positive number n, let Wn denote the proposition ‘The
nth planet from Earth is the closest planet that contains water.” So H2 may
be thought of as the infinite disjunction of all Wns.
We claim it is rationally permissible for Cusa to believe that, for suffi-
ciently large numbers n, the proposition Wn has positive probability. Why?
There is some chance that very distant planets contain water, and if so,
there must be a closest such planet. Further, for sufficiently large numbers
n and k, Cusa may permissibly believe that Wn and Wk as equally likely,
since Cusa knows nothing that would distinguish very far away planets from
one another. Yet if Cusa holds such beliefs, we claim that his comparative
credences are not real-valued. To see why, consider the following condition.
Qualitative weak Archimedean condition for credence (qwac): Ev-
ery bounded and disjoint sequence of events is finite in length, where a
sequence A1, A2, . . . is bounded and disjoint if it has three properties:
1. Ai ∩Aj = ∅ if i 6= j,
2. Ai  A1 for all i, and
3. A1  ∅.
Why is qwac to the Archimedean condition for real numbers? Think of
the events A1, A2, . . . as line segments, just as real numbers were depicted
by line segments above. Condition 1 says the line segments do not overlap;
condition 2 says all of the segments are at least as long the first one, and
condition 3 says the first segment has positive length. So if there were an
infinite sequence of bounded and disjoint events A1, A2, . . ., then its union
B =
⋃
n∈NAn would be representable by an infinite line and would be “in-
finitely more probable” than A1.
If an an agent’s comparative credence relation  is representable by a
finitely additive probability measure P , then  satisfies qwac.8 Thus, if it
is rationally permissible for one’s credences  to violate qwac, then it is
rationally permissible to have credences that violate the probability axioms.
We now defend the antecedent of that conditional.
8Proof: Otherwise, there is an infinite bounded and disjoint sequence A1, A2, . . ., and
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Suppose Nicolas of Cusa believes there are infinitely many planets other
than Earth, and imagine he enumerates those planets 1, 2, etc., in terms of
their distance from Earth.9 For each n ≥ 1, let Wn be the proposition that
“Planet n is the first non-Earth planet in Cusa’s enumeration that contains
water.” The events Wn and Wm are disjoint if m 6= n because two different
planets cannot both be the first in Cusa’s enumeration to contain water.
Intuitively, it is rationally permissible to believe that some far away
planet other than Earth contains water. Thus, we claim it is rationally
permissible for Cusa to regard Wn0 as strictly more probable than the con-
tradictory event ∅ for some sufficiently large number n0. For example, Cusa
might reason as follows: “I have no knowledge whatsoever of the 137th
planet from Earth, and it is possible that said planet contains water on its
surface.” Let A1 = Wn0 , and in general, An = Wn+n0 . Because Wm and Wn
are disjoint when m 6= n, so are Am and An. Hence, 〈An〉n∈N satisfies the
first condition of a bounded and disjoint sequence. Because Cusa regards
A1 = Wn0 as strictly more likely than ∅, the third condition is also satisfied.
Finally, because n0 is very large, it is rationally permissible, we think,
to regard the following two claims as equally likely: “Planet n0 is the first
planet in Cusa’s enumeration to contain water” and “Planet n + n0 is the
first planet in Cusa’s enumeration to contain water”, where n is any natural
number. After all, what Cusa knows about very distant planets does not
distinguish planet n0 from planet n + n0. Thus, we believe it is rationally
permissible for Cusa to regard An to be as likely as A1 for all n. Hence,
Cusa’s credences in the An’s satisfy the three conditions of a bounded and
disjoint sequence, and because Cusa believes there are infinitely many plan-
ets, the sequence 〈An〉n∈N is infinite. Thus, Cusa’s credences violate the
Archimedean condition above, and we have argued there is nothing ratio-
nally impermissible about those credences.
One might object that it is irrational to regard A10100 as equiprobable as
A1. Why? Imagine an explorer sets forth from Earth searching for planets







P (Ak) as Ai ∩Aj = ∅ if i 6= j
≥ n · P (A1) as A1  Ai for all i
Since ∅ ≺ A1, we know P (A1) = r > 0. Hence, by the Archimedean property of real
numbers, there is some sufficiently large n such that P (
⋃
k≤nAk) ≥ n · r > 1, which is a
contradiction.
9Cusa does not consider the possibility that the number of planets is uncountable. Nor
should he for physical reasons.
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with water. If A10 were as probable as A10100 , then the explorer would be
just as likely to encounter ten consecutive waterless planets as she would be
to encounter a googolplex of waterless planets.10 Finding that consequence
unpalatable, one might argue that there must be some sufficiently large
number m1 such that Cusa regards Am1 as less probable than A1. And if
one repeats the same reasoning, one would conclude there must be some
sufficiently large number m2 > m1 such that Cusa regards Am2 as less
probable than Am1 . And so on. If the sequence A1, A2, . . . decreases in
probability in this way, then qwac is satisfied.
The problem with this objection is that, for a credal ordering to be
representable as a probability function, it is not sufficient for it to obey
qwac (even in conjunction with other standard “axioms” for credence). To




4 . . . is decreasing, its sum∑
n≥2
1
n = ∞ diverges. In general, even if a real-valued function P (An)
decreases strictly with each n, if the terms do not decrease fast enough, then
P is not a probability measure. Thus, any Archimedean condition that is
sufficient for probabilism must require not only that Cusa’s credences in
An decrease, but also that they decrease at a specific rate. We think it is
implausible that such a precise constraint is a requirement of rationality. To
keep our exposition brief, we will not state an Archimedean condition that
is sufficient for real-valued representation; see [Fishburn, 1986, p. 342] for
several versions.
2 Collectivist Foundations for Bayesianism
2.1 Public Probabilism
In the previous section, we argued that several arguments for probabilism —
which appeal to behaviorist assumptions or to norms of individual rationality
— share a common weakness: they do not justify qwac. We now argue
that, luckily, to justify the use of Bayesian statistics in science, one need not
assume that a scientist’s private credences satisfy the probability axioms.
Our view is not entirely novel. Many statisticians already reject the view
that the prior probability distributions appearing in scientific journals should
be interpreted as the author’s credences. For example, [Gelman and Shalizi,
2013, p. 19], two prominent statisticians, write, “. . . the prior distribution
p(θ) is one of the assumptions of the model and does not need to represent
10This objection is inspired by an objection raised by an anonymous referee, whose
comments significantly improved this paper.
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the statistician’s personal degree of belief in alternative parameter values.”
They continue:
We do not have to worry about making our prior distributions
match our subjective beliefs still less about our model containing
all possible truths. Instead we make some assumptions, state
them clearly, see what they imply, and check the implications.
This applies just [as] much to the prior distribution as it does
to the parts of the model showing up in the likelihood function
[Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, p. 20].
We will not reconstruct Gelman and Shalizi’s view in detail, but the quo-
tation raises an interesting possibility: Bayesian statistical methods might
be justified without discussing rational belief at all!
Unlike Gelman and Shalizi, we do think of prior probabilities as rep-
resenting belief in some sense, but not as representing the experimenter’s
actual credences, nor even as idealizations of those credences. Instead, prior
probabilities are, we claim, best interpreted as a model of a scientist’s public
(or “professional”) credences.
We think of modeling scientists’ beliefs in much the same way one might
model the beliefs of a juror in a criminal trial. Famously, jurors are required
to ignore some types of evidence (e.g., hearsay), and they are obliged to
consider other types (e.g., exhibits introduced during trial). A model of
a juror’s decision-making — whether descriptive or normative — could be
wildly inaccurate if it considered only the private beliefs of the juror qua
citizen; what matters are the beliefs of the juror qua juror. We refer to these
as the juror’s public beliefs. The juror’s public beliefs are, we think, right-
fully called “beliefs” because they explain the juror’s courtroom behavior in
much the way her private beliefs explain her behavior in her private life.11
Analogously, participation in a scientific community requires one to adopt
certain beliefs and to modify those beliefs in a particular way, regardless of
one’s private opinions. A model of scientific decision-making — whether
normative or descriptive — might likewise be inaccurate if it confuses the
beliefs of a scientist qua scientist with her beliefs qua private citizen.
11Nothing in our argument hinges on us calling the juror’s attitudes “beliefs.” Some
philosophers might prefer to say the juror “accepts” certain propositions [Cohen, 1992,
Levi, 1967, Maher, 1993, Van Fraassen, 1980]. For those who prefer the language of
acceptance, our thesis is that scientists have some professional, graded acceptance-like
attitude that must obey the probability axioms. [Fleisher, 2018] defends a similar thesis,
namely, that the hypotheses a scientists endorses should be selected to maximize expected
(epistemic) utility. Comparing our view to Fleisher’s is beyond the scope of this paper.
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For example, consider the paleontologist Marcus Ross, who identifies as a
creationist.12 Ross professes to believe that the universe is only 10,000 years
old despite having written a dissertation on a marine animal that is widely
accepted to be 65 million year old. When asked whether the reasoning in
his dissertation was sound, Ross responded, “Within the context of old age
and evolutionary theory, yes. But if the parameter is different, portions of it
could be completely in error.” Here, Ross distinguishes between his private
beliefs and what he advocates on the pages of scientific journals. Ross’
personal religious convictions, therefore, might play a relatively unimportant
role in explaining or predicting his professional behavior.
Similarly, any attempt to evaluate Ross’ scientific work should not con-
fuse his scientific reasoning with his religious thinking. Ross’ publications,
grant proposals, and teaching — his behavior qua scientist — might be sci-
entifically rigorous and satisfy all the demands of normative decision theory.
Of course, Ross’ behavior considered as a whole may be deeply irrational:
his professional choices seem incoherent given his private beliefs. Yet that
irrationality is irrelevant to the coherence of his professional behavior.
As Ross’ work illustrates, a scientist’s “public” beliefs may diverge from
her private beliefs because she is obliged to act is if she endorses the core
background assumptions of her field. Paleontologists, for instance, must act
as they believe that the Earth is more than 10,000 years old.
Because a scientist’s private credences may differ from her public ones
(i.e., her credences qua scientist), probabilism — if understood as a thesis
about a scientist’s private credences — is neither necessary nor sufficient to
justify the use of Bayesian statistics in science. Instead, the use of Bayesian
statistics requires the truth of what we call public probabilism, which asserts
that a scientist’s public credences should obey the probability axioms, at
least on a restricted set of propositions in her domain of expertise.
Although we have thusfar focused on a scientist’s public beliefs at a fixed
time, we emphasize that Bayesianism and other epistemological theories typ-
ically contain norms (e.g., conditionalization) about how one should modify
one’s beliefs in response to evidence. To justify the use of Bayesian meth-
ods in science, therefore, it is again not sufficient to argue that a scientist’s
private credences are updated by conditionalization: one must argue that a
scientist’s public credences are changed in that way.
Luckily, there are good reasons to believe diachronic epistemological
norms might likewise be justified by norms of collective science. In general,
when we participate in different social institutions (e.g., as jurors, journal
12Our description of Ross’s beliefs is based on [Rosin, 2007]’s report.
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referees, etc.), there are two reason we may be required to respond to ev-
idence in ways we would not as private individuals. First, the evidence
that we are required to consider (or not) in virtue of the institution’s goals
may differ from the evidence that is available to us as individuals. Second
and most importantly for our purposes, procedural constraints require us
to evaluate evidence in particular ways (e.g., rubrics in hiring committees).
We now elaborate one such procedural constraint, which we call “epistemic
cooperativeness”, and we explain how it can be used to justify qwac.
2.2 Epistemic Cooperativeness
In the next section, we argue that a norm of scientific inquiry, which we
call epistemic cooperativeness (or just “cooperativeness” for short), requires
that scientists’ public credences obey qwac. In this section, we define “co-
operativeness” and argue it is a norm of contemporary science.13
Epistemic cooperativeness, in our sense, is a relation between a re-
searcher, a scientific question, and a community, which may include both
experts and laypersons. Roughly, we say a researcher is epistemically co-
operative (or just “cooperative”, for short) if she is publicly open-minded
towards all “live” hypotheses about the question at hand. For example,
Galileo was cooperative towards his peers and the general public with re-
spect to the question of whether a heliocentric or geocentric model best
explained everyday phenomena and astronomical data at his time. Whether
Galileo privately believed that geocentrism was unfathomably stupid is ir-
relevant to whether he was cooperative in our sense. Galileo’s published
writings and his correspondences with Church officials contain a serious en-
gagement with geocentrism.
We emphasize three features of our definition of cooperativeness. First,
what counts as “live” can change; astronomers no longer need to test geocen-
tric models. Second, a scientist may be cooperative but extremely critical
of her peers’ work. Third, cooperativeness does not require “impartiality”
on “non-partisanship.” A cooperative scientist may seek to discredit others
and to confirm her own pet hypotheses. In fact, an epistemically cooperative
scientist may be motivated entirely by fame, monetary prizes, and personal
grudges against her rivals.14
13Although sociologists of science have studied norms of science extensively (e.g., see
“The Normative Structure of Science” in [Merton, 1973]), our notion of “epistemically
cooperative” cuts across several different purported scientific norms (e.g., Merton’s norms
of “disinterestedness”, “universalism”, and “communism”), and so we give it a new name.
14We take no stance on whether such behavior or motivations violate other scientific,
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What precisely is required to be cooperative in our sense? Here is a very
weark condition that we think is necessary (but insufficient).
Weak, Diachronic Credal Cooperativeness: (dcc): If H1 and H2 are
live hypotheses and a scientist receives an indefinite amount of evidence that
(a) is for H1 and (b) favors H1 over H2, then she must eventually not regard
H2 as infinitely more likely than H1.
15
The reader might wonder why what we call “cooperativeness” is a norm
that arises only for scientists engaged in collective inquiry. Why would an
inquisitive person deserted on a remote island not be bound by the same
norms? Why not call the virtues we have described “open-mindedness” or
“vigilance against error”, which are phrases that seem to describe virtues
that a researcher can exhibit in isolation?
We do not deny the existence of purely individualistic epistemic norms.
We claim only that those norms, if they exist, are weaker than what many
philosophers have imagined. To see why, consider the question, “Which
hypotheses should a scientist take seriously when evaluating data?” Clearly,
a scientist is not obliged to consider all hypotheses that explain her data for
there are innumerable such hypotheses that have yet to be articulated.
We claim that the set of hypotheses that a scientist is obliged to consider
depends upon, among other things, the history of her field of study and the
current work of her peers. Why? A scientist would be considered negligent
if, each time she acquired novel data or designed a new experiment, she
ignored all past research and considered only several new hypotheses that
she personally devised. Practically speaking, the norm to consider rival
hypotheses is often enforced through peer review, where referees for grant-
giving institutions and journals evaluate whether the proposer or author has
discussed and cited “relevant” or “appropriate” literature.”16 Similar prac-
moral, or social norms. However, Kitcher [1990, 1995] and Strevens [2003] argue that
“epistemically impure” motives might improve science. For criticisms of those arguments,
see [Zollman, 2018] [Heesen, 2018] and [O’Connor and Bruner, 2019].
15Here, we follow likelihoodists like [Edwards, 1984] and [Royall, 1997], who use the word
“favors” to denote a ternary relation between some datum and two hypotheses. Note a
datum may “favor” one hypothesis over another but be poor evidence for both. This is
why the first condition of dcc requires that E is evidence for H1. For the moment, we
leave the notions of “evidence for” and “favoring” undefined, but we discuss some theories
below. Equipped with such theories, we can say a sequence of propositions 〈Ei〉i∈I is
“indefinite” evidence for H1 if (1) Ei is evidence for H1 for all i ∈ I, (2) I is infinite, and
(3) the Eis are mutually conditionally independent given every θj ∈ Hj for j = 1, 2, where
θj is a disjunct that makes Hj true. Define “indefinite favoring” similarly.
16 For example, referees for Nature are asked, “does this manuscript reference previous
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tices show many scientists’ obligations depend upon their institutional roles
(e.g., as employees of public universities, members of academic societies,
journal referees, etc.) and upon the interests of society at large.
One might object that, although cooperativeness is a collective norm,
dcc is not. The objector might grant that the set of hypotheses that a
scientist must consider is determined (in part) by professional and social
obligations, but that once that set is determined, dcc amounts to the duty
to be responsive to evidence. Such a demand is a paradigmatic norm of
individual (epistemic) rationality.
We disagree. As we show in the next section, dcc entails that a scientist’s
credences should obey qwac. Thus, if a rational agent’s credences may
violate qwac, then dcc is not a requirement of individual rationality. For
example, we have argued that Nicholas of Cusa is individually rational, but
we will argue he is not weakly cooperative, if the hypothesis that “Earth
is the only planet with water” is live. The objector, we think, mistakes a
vague, individualistic epistemic norm (to consider evidence) with a rather
precise, formal consequence of cooperativeness.
At the very least, we think the normative force of dcc is strengthened by
a scientist’s obligations towards others. Imagine an uncooperative scientist
S who publicly believes a hypothesis H and might continue to believe H
(publicly) in the face of indefinite evidence to the contrary. In such a case,
S’s colleagues would be unlikely to seek out her paper defending H, for her
colleagues would know that S might conclude that H despite large amounts
of disconfirming evidence; after all, S’s dogmatic stance towards H is public.
If S’s data were publicly accessible, then expert readers could evalu-
ate the data themselves. But data are not always publicly accessible, and
reanalyzing another researcher’s work is often costly and time-consuming.
Equally importantly, some scientists may need to rely on S’s results but lack
the technical knowledge to re-analyze S’s data. Finally, even if S honestly
discloses her data, her colleagues might worry that she ignored or failed to
report relevant evidence because, by supposition, some pieces of evidence
will not sway S at all. In short, if a scientist is uncooperative in our sense,
then her research is likely to be ignored by her colleagues, and if it is not
ignored, it might not be trusted. Thus, even if dcc is partially supported by
norms of individualistic rationality, its force is strengthened by considering
a scientist’s obligations to her peers.
Is cooperativeness so described actually a norm of science? As we have
literature appropriately? If not, what references should be included or excluded?”[Board,
2020].
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discussed, peer review (of articles and grant proposals) suggests that sci-
entists are required to evaluate how well their evidence bears on a variety
of live hypotheses. Contemporary calls for pre-registered trials — with the
requirement to include a detailed data-analysis plans — provide further ev-
idence that scientists are discouraged from using methods that preclude the
possibility of finding support for their rivals’ hypotheses [Nosek et al., 2018].
2.3 Non-Archimedean credences violate epistemic coopera-
tiveness
We now argue that if a scientist initially regards one hypothesis H2 as “in-
finitely more probable” than another H1 — in other words, her prior cre-
dences over hypotheses violate the Archimedean condition — then she might
acquire an indefinite amount of data favoring H1 and nonetheless continue to
believe that H2 is infinitely more plausible than H1.
17 Thus, her beliefs vio-
late dcc. To explain our argument, we rely on the example involving Nicolas
of Cusa, but by appropriate substitutions, our formal argument generalizes
to any case in which an experimenter has non-Archimedean credences in the
sense described in §1.2
As before, suppose Cusa regards the hypothesis H2 “At least two planets
contain water” as infinitely more probable than H1, “Only Earth contains
water.” More precisely, assume H2 can be understood as the disjunction
H2 =
⋃
n∈NAn of infinitely many hypotheses, where An asserts that “Planet
n is the first planet in the enumeration that contains water.” We formal-
ized the idea that Cusa regards H2 as “infinitely more probable” than H1
by assuming that the propositions A1, A2, . . . are at least as probable as
H1. Since the An’s form an infinite, disjoint sequence, this means Cusa’s
credences violate the comparative Archimedean condition we discussed.18
Now imagine that, on successive discrete stages of inquiry — call those
stages 1, 2, and so on — Cusa learns the proposition En, “Planet n does
not contain water.” After n many stages, Cusa will know
⋂
k≤nEk, which










17Some philosophers have argued that being appropriately “open-minded” requires that
one’s credences be representable by hyperreals, which violates an Archimedean condition.
See [Easwaran, 2014] for a summary and criticism of those arguments.
18Recall, in the previous section we defined Ak to be the proposition “The (n0 + k)
th
planet from Earth contains water”, where n0 is a number that is large enough to guarantee
that Cusa has no knowledge distinguishing planets numbered n0 or greater. To simplify
notation, we let n0 = 0 in the remainder of the paper.
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assert that none of the first n many planets contain water. So on stage n,
Cusa believes




which is the proposition “Either only Earth contains water or the first non-
Earth planet that contains water must be numbered n+ 1 or larger.”
Thus, on stage n, Cusa’s credences in H1 and H2 on stage n should be
represented by the expressions H1|Fn and H2|Fn respectively. We now argue
that Cusa still regards H2 as “infinitely more probable” than H1 at every
stage n, thus violating dcc. More precisely, we prove that, conditional on
Fn, the sequence H1, An+1, An+2, . . . is infinite, bounded and disjoint under
the following assumption about Cusa’s credal relation .
Assumption: For any piece of evidence E and any hypotheses H and
H ′, if (a) H ∩ E  H ′ ∩ E and (b) H|E and H ′|E are well-defined, then
H|E  H ′|E. If the inequality in (a) is strict, then H|E ≺ H ′|E.
The assumption is somewhat controversial. It asserts that, at every stage
of inquiry, Cusa’s posterior credences are constrained by his initial/prior
credences.19 That is true if Cusa’s prior credences are representable by a
numerical probability function P and, for any hypothesis H and datum E,
his posterior credence P (H|E) in H after learning E is defined by the ratio
formula P (H|E) = P (H∩E)P (E) . In other words, the assumption is true if Cusa
is a Bayesian. However, we think it is plausible even if Cusa’s credences
are not probabilistic and if the axioms governing comparative/qualitative
probability permit conditioning on events with zero probability.
We now prove that, at every stage of inquiry, Cusa still regards H2 as
infinitely more probable than H1.
Claim: Ak+n|Fn  H1|Fn for all n and all k ≥ 1. Further, H1|Fn 
∅|Fn, and so the sequence H1, An+1, An+2, . . . is a bounded disjoint sequence
conditional on Fn.
Proof: To prove the first claim, note that by assumption, Am  H1 for
all m. Thus, Ak+n  H1 for all n and all k ≥ 1. Since H1 ∩ Fn = H1,
it follows that Ak+n  H1 = H1 ∩ Fn for all n and all k ≥ 1. Similarly,
Ak+n ∩ Fn = Ak+n as Ak+n ⊆ Fn. Thus, Ak+n ∩ Fn  H1 ∩ Fn. By the
assumption, it follows that Ak+n|Fn  H1|Fn for all n and all k ≥ 1.
19In other words, it entails what [Levi, 1983, p. 82] calls “confirmational tenacity.” Levi
rejects the principle as a type of dogmatism.
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To show the second claim, note ∅ ∩ Fn = ∅ ≺ H1 = H1 ∩ Fn by assump-
tion that H1, A1, . . . is a bounded disjoint sequence (specifically, the third
condition). So by the assumption above, ∅|Fn ≺ H1|Fn as desired. 
To sum up, in §1.2, we argued that Nicolas of Cusa can be rational while
holding the private belief H2, that “At least two planets contain water”,
no many how many waterless planets he observes. But if his peers regard
hypothesis H1 “Only Earth contains water” as a legitimate competitor to
H2, then Cusa violates the norm of epistemic cooperativeness if he collects
only data that he knows will never lead him to take his peers’ view seriously
in his professional life.
One might object that, in the example given, Cusa never acquires evi-
dence that favors H1 over H2. After all, each new observation of a waterless
planet is still compatible with there being at least one distant planet con-
taining water. And if no observation En favors H1 over H2, then Cusa does
not violate dcc. Further, one might object that no datum could really count
as evidence for H1 because, if there really are infinitely many planets, then
H1 is unverifiable.
These objections are not without merit. In fact, several theories of fa-
voring and evidence vindicate the objections. For example, according to one
version of likelihoodism [Edwards, 1984, Royall, 1997], a datum E favors one
simple/atomic hypothesis θ1 over another θ2 when Pθ1(E) > Pθ2(E), and
E favors a composite/disjunctive hypothesis H1 over H2 if and only if E
favors θ1 over θ2 for every disjunct θ1 of H1 and every disjunct θ2 of H2. In
our example, a qualitative version of such a likelihoodist theory would say
that En favors the one-planet hypothesis H1 over the alternative H2 if and
only if En|H1  En|Ak for every k. But since both H1 and An+1 entail En
(as both entail the nth planet does not contain water), one might reject the
claim that En is more probable under H1 than under An+1.
Our response is that the running example shows the limitations of such
a theory of favoring. While each observation of a waterless planet is com-
patible with some way that H2 might be true, each also refutes infinitely
many other ways H2 could have been true (specifically, each En refutes An,
and there are infinitely many ways that the nth planet might be the first
non-Earth planet with water). Further, each En is entailed by H1. For these
reasons, we suspect that many readers will, like us, believe the conjunction⋂
k≤nEk favors H1 over H2 in some meaningful sense.
Small modifications to the likelihoodist thesis above support that intu-
ition. For instance, one might argue that E favors a composite/disjunctive
hypothesis H1 over H2 if and only if (1) E favors at least one disjunct θ1
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of H1 over at least one disjunct θ2 of H2 and (2) no pair of disjuncts of the
two hypotheses yield a favoring relation in the reverse direction. By that
criterion, each datum En favors H1 over H2 in our main example.
Minor variants of Bayesian confirmation theory also entail that (a) at
least one datum En is evidence for H1 and (b) no Ek is evidence against
H1. For example, a confirmation theorist might argue that E confirms H
if (1) P (H|E) > P (H) for at least one rational prior P that assigns H
positive probability and (2) there is no rational prior P that assigns H
positive probability such that P (H|E) < P (H).20 Because we have argued
that rational credence need not be probabilistic, clearly we do not endorse
such a theory of evidence. But conditions (1) and (2) have plausible, purely
qualitative analogs,21 and with plausible assumptions about rational credal
orderings, those qualitative analogs likewise entail that least one datum En
is evidence for H1 and no En is evidence against H.
The main limitation of our argument, as noted in §1.2, is that qwac is
not sufficient for a credal relation to admit a probabilistic representation,
even in the presence of other plausible constraints on a rational credal re-
lation (e.g., transitivity, additivity, and so on). Despite this limitation, we
think the above argument shows how norms of collective science might be
used to justify, at least partially, comparative axioms that are necessary
for an experimenter’s public credences to obey the probability axioms. Im-
portantly, we do not claim that norms of collective science are sufficient,
by themselves, to justify public probabilism; norms of individual rationality
might still have some role to play.
2.4 Comparison to other norms
Our weak, diachronic, credal cooperaticness norm (dcc) may appear similar
to other “open-mindedness” norms defended by formal epistemologists and
philosophers of science. For example, some argue that rational credence
should be represented by a regular probability measure, i.e., a function P
such that P (A) > 0 whenever A is non-empty. So as not to presuppose
probabilism, we can rephrase regularity as follows: if  is a rational credal
20If rational priors are countably additive, then we can replace (i) and (ii) by the
requirement that P (H|E) > P (H) for every rational prior P . Why? If P is countably
additive, then since P (H2) > 0, it follows that P (An) > 0 for some n. Thus, if Cusa learns
En, he rules out a disjunct of H2 that had positive prior probability. As P (H2) < 1,
it follows that P (H2|En) < P (H2). Since P (H1|En) = 1 − P (H2|En) and P (H1) =
1− P (H2), the result follows.
21For example, the qualitative analog of condition 1 is that H|E  H for every rational
credal ordering  such that H  ∅.
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ordering, then A  ∅ for any A 6= ∅. Of course, our justification for dcc
differs from existing arguments for regularity and similar “open-mindedness”
requirements, as the latter are intended to be requirements of individual
rationality. But there are two further differences between dcc and regularity.
First, dcc is a diachronic condition that describes how one’s credences
should change. Regularity, in contrast, is synchronic. For this reason, regu-
larity should really be compared to a synchronic norm, such as qwac.
Second, regularity is inconsistent with probabilism when there are un-
countably many disjoint events, as for example, when one is uncertain about
the value of a physical constant that might be represented by any real num-
ber. Because such cases are ubiquitous in science, Bayesian statisticians
retain probabilism but often relax regularity to require only that an experi-
menter’s credences are representable by a probability measure that has full
support, i.e., that it assigns positive probability to all non-empty open sets.22
In contrast, both dcc and qwac are consistent with probabilism, no
matter the size of the algebra of events. That implies both dcc and qwac
are consistent with assigning probability zero to some hypotheses. But is
a scientist really “cooperative” if she assigns probability zero to some live
hypotheses? We think so, as long as her degrees of belief have full support
on the set of live hypotheses. But we will not defend that claim here.
One might object that we purport to derive a synchronic norm (qwac)
from a diachronic one (dcc), and such an argument could not be valid. Our
response has three parts: (i) our argument relies on two diachronic norms,
(ii) those two norms are “diachronic” in different ways, and (iii) synchronic
norms can be derived from an appropriate combination of diachronic ones.
In fact, our argumentative strategy is analogous to defenses of regularity (or
the weaker full support condition) that are recognized as valid.23
For instance, consider the following defense of regularity. Suppose (pace
our thesis) a rational agent has probabilistic credences that are updated by
conditionalization. Then regularity (or the weaker full support variant) is
necessary to guarantee that one’s posterior credences concentrate on the true
hypothesis.24 Here, a synchronic norm (regularity) is derived from a norm
22Still other philosophers retain regularity by relaxing probabilism and arguing that
“open-mindedness” requires that one’s credences are representable by hyperreal numbers,
which violate an Archimedean condition. See [Easwaran, 2014] for a summary and criti-
cism of those arguments.
23Of course, the premises of such defenses are controversial.
24See [Freedman, 1963], which shows that having a prior with full support is also suffi-
cient if the parameter space is finite dimensional and insufficient in the infinite dimensional
case. For an up-to-date bibliography of “Bayesian consistency” results, see [Shalizi, 2020].
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requiring asymptotic reliability (concentration of one’s posterior) via a norm
(conditionalization) that specifies how one’s credences change with each new
piece of evidence. Analogously, we derive a synchronic norm (qwac) from a
norm requiring asymptotic reliability (cooperativeness) via the Assumption
of the previous section, which specifies how one’s credal ordering changes
with each new piece of evidence
3 Further Objections and Replies
Norms often conflict, and so norms of individual rationality likely conflict
with norms of collective science [Mayo-Wilson et al., 2011]. Thus, one might
object that our appeal to both types of norms to justify public probabilism
is illegitimate, as contradictory norms could justify any thesis whatsoever.
Such an objection proves too much, as it applies to any normative thesis
about a juror’s duties, a doctor’s obligations, a sporting referee’s responsi-
bilities, and so on. For instance, Bayesian decision theory entails one should
never turn down free information [Good, 1967], but jurors are required to
turn down free evidence if it is inadmissible.25 However, despite the appar-
ent conflict between norms for jurors and norms of individual rationality,
no one thinks that “any thesis whatsoever” about jurors’ obligations can be
justified by the two types of norms.
Where does the objection go wrong? To answer that question, note
there are at least two ways the objection can be disambiguated. First, our
critics might claim that a scientist’s duties might conflict with her duties as
a private citizen, in the same way a criminal lawyer’s obligation to defend
a client she knows to be guilty might conflict with her duty, qua private
citizen, to report known criminal activity. Of course, we agree that private
and professional obligations often conflict. But notice the conflicts in the
lawyer’s private and professional duties do nothing to challenge the thesis
that, qua lawyer, she is obliged to defend her client. Similarly, the fact that
a scientist has conflicting private and professional duties does little to refute
our thesis that, qua scientist, she should have probabilistic credences.
Second, the objector might continue that our defense of public proba-
bilism is importantly disanalogous from the examples involving lawyers and
jurors. Lawyers’ professional duties qua lawyers override their obligations
qua private citizens; similar remarks apply to jurors. Conflict is avoided by
specifying a priority of duties. In contrast, a defense of public probabilism
might, we have claimed, require appeals to both norms of collective science
25Thanks to Blinded for review for this example.
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and norms of individual rationality; if one of those types of norms outranks
the other in cases of conflict, one may be unable to use both types in defense
of public probabilism.
We think this objection gains plausibility by trading on ambiguity. It
may be plausible that some norms of collective science conflict with some
norms of individual rationality. But thusfar, we have little reason to suspect
the conflicting norms are the ones required to justify public probabilism.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We have argued that, although rational private credences may violate an
Archimedean condition, a scientist’s public credences may not. But our ar-
gument is only a small step towards justifying public probabilism. Future
work should investigate to what extent collective norms of science can jus-
tify other “axioms” for credence that (a) are necessary for probabilism but
(b) may be poorly justified by norms of individual rationality. Similar work
should investigate the possibility of collectivist foundations for conditional-
ization, the central diachronic norm of Bayesianism.
Finally, we think our framework opens up potential avenues for justifying
other parts of Bayesian statistical practice that have received less attention
from philosophers. As we mentioned in the introduction, Bayesian philoso-
phers have yet to defend the various conventional prior distributions and
loss functions that Bayesian statisticians adopt in practice. From the tradi-
tional individualistic standpoint, it is potentially irrational to analyze one’s
data using a prior or loss function that fails to represent one’s credences or
preferences. Are there, for example, collectivist defenses of conjugate pri-
ors? Priors good frequentist properties? And so on. Similarly, can appeal to
norms of collective science help justify the computational techniques (e.g.,
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo methods) that Bayesians use to approximate
their posterior distributions when an exact calculation is impossible?
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